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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
JONATHAND. REED 
80232 ICC IR 18 B 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
(208) 331-2760 
APPELLANT prose 
HONORABLE CHERI C. COPSEY 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General, State of Idaho 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-2400 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jonathan D. Reed appeals from the district court's Final Order Denying Post Conviction 
Relief. Mr. Reed asserts that the district court erred by denying his attorney from arguing 
ineffective counsel at evidentiary hearing due to deficiencies in the pro se petition. Mr. Reed 
asserts that fundamental error occu1Ted when trial counsel failed to adequately communicate a 
plea offer resulting in prejudice. Mr. Reed also asserts his right to have initially pied guilty prior 
to the filing of the Amended Information Count II, thereby avoiding exposure to the persistent 
violator enhancement. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On March 5, 2008, Mr. Reed pleaded guilty to the crimes of failure to register as a sex 
offender and of being a persistent violator of law. (R., p.4.) The court retained jurisdiction; 
ordering Mr. Reed to undergo a sex offender evaluation program from within the department of 
correction "Rider" program. Mr. Reed secured a favorable recommendation for probation stating 
he was/is amenable to treatment in the community. The district court parted from the 
recommendation and imposed a unified sentence of twenty five years with three years fixed . (R., 
p.5.) On March 27, 2009, Mr. Reed sought reduction of the sentence pursuant to ICR 35. (R., 
p.5. ) The district court concluded the filing was frivolous and denied relief. On January 6, 2010, 
Mr. Reed filed a petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 1 (R., p.4-11 .) 
1 A file stamp was placed upon the petition on January 8, 2010. (R. p.4.) However, it was filed 
January 6,2010 when he placed it into the prison mail system. See Shelton v. Shelton, 148 Idaho 
560, 565, 225 P.3d 693, 698 n.6 (2009). 
In his prose verified petition2, Mr. Reed asserted the following grounds for relief: 
8 ( c) The Petitioner was initially appointed counsel through the office of the 
Ada County Public Defender's Office. Attorney's Richard D. Toothman and 
Eric R. Rolfsen were assigned to represent Mr. Reed. Following the 
arraignment a Preliminary Settlement offer was tendered by Deputy Ada 
County Prosecuting Attorney "CAG". Defense counsel never appraised the 
Petitioner of the offer to plead guilty to Count I of the Information in 
exchange for a sentencing recommendation of one (I) year fixed, four (4) 
years indeterminate. Failing to disclose this offer amounts to ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Mr. Reed was prejudiced by counsels [sic] deficient 
performance. (R., p.6.) 
8 ( d) Unaware of the aforementioned plea offer, the Petitioner hired Jared B. 
Martens, a private attorney to represent him. Notice of Substitution of counsel 
was filed on or about February 25, 2008. Mr. Reed expressed a desire to 
plead guilty to which Mr. Martens inquired as to the rationale to reject the 
earlier plea offer. It was then learned the offer was no longer available. Ada 
Public Defender's withheld critical information from the Defendant, which 
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. The proximate result of their 
deficient performance was realized when the Court, on January 8, 2008, 
granted the State leave to file an Amended Information, Count II, Persistent 
Violator, I.C. § 19-2514, a charge that carries a potential life sentence. The 
Defendant had an absolute right to have plead guilty when he first expressed a 
desire to do so with his former government appointed attorney's Messrs. 
Toothman and Rolfsen. Mr. Reed suffered an undeniable prejudice when the 
Court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five (25) years given he had requested 
to plead guilty to Count I, prior to the filing of the enhanced charge. (R., p.6.) 
The district court later appointed counsel to represent the petitioner. (R., p.12) 
In point of fact, a significant mistake occurred when another inmate typed Mr. Reed's 
petition, thereby misstating the facts outlined in claim 8( d). Mr. Reed then inadvertently signed 
the verified pleading without noticing the error and subsequently filed it with the court. (Tr. p.29 
- sic passim) 
Testimony was elicited at the hearing sufficient to explain such oversight as contained 
within Mr. Reed's application. Mr. Reed, being untrained in the law, attempted to protect his 
2 Although the appellant signed and swore to the contents within the verified petition, another 
inmate/ lay assistant actually drafted and prepared the pleading in Mr. Reed's behalf. 
2 
claims from a strict interpretation or analysis of his pro se petition by denoting an entire 
paragraph to avoid any undue scrutiny. (R., p.7-8 ~ 12) Notwithstanding these facts, the district 
court refused to permit appointed counsel from curing the deficiency within claim (8d), or, from 
arguing the cumulative impact that inadequate communication of the plea offer, or insufficient 




I. Did the district court err in dismissing claim's 8 (c), 8(d) of Mr. Reed's Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief because the evidence presented met the preponderance of evidence 




The District Court Erred Erred In Dismissing Claim's 8 (c), 8(d) Of Mr. Reed's Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief Because The Evidence Presented Met The Preponderance Of Evidence 
Threshold Sufficient To Warrant Relief. 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Reed asserts that the district court erred by dismissing his claims. 
B. Standard Of Review In Post-Conviction Cases 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature. 
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002) ( citing State v. 
Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678m 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830, 
452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,921,828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 
1992)). The Goodwin Court continued that, "[s]ummary dismissal of an application pursuant to 
J.C. § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56." Goodwin, 
138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628 ( citations omitted). "Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the 
applicant must prove by preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for 
post-conviction relief is based." Id. Moreover, "[a]n application for postO-conviction must 
contain much more than 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that would suffice for a 
complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)( I)." Id. The Goodwin Court noted that, "an application for post-
conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or 
the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application." Id. 
at 271-272, 61 P.3d at 628-629 (citation omitted). "In other words, the application must present 
5 
or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be 
subject to dismissal." Id. at 272, 61 P.3d at 629. 
The appellate court will exercise free review of the district court's application of the 
relevant law to the facts. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 
1992). The review of a "district court's construction and application of a statute, the Uniform 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA), is a matter of free review." Evensioski v. State, 136 
Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001) (citations omitted). 
On review of a summary dismissal of a post-conviction relief petition following an 
evidentiary hearing, the appellate court determines whether the, affidavits and other evidence 
presented at the evidentiary hearing entitle the applicant to relief. Berg v. State, 13 I Idaho 517, 
960 P.2d 738, 740 (1998); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 492 (Ct. App. 
1995). Ultimately, a petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claims are based. !CR 57( c ). After 
dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, the reviewing court exercises free and 
independent review of the district court's application of law, including constitutional issues. 
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561 (2006). 
In claim 8( c ), Mr. Reed asserted that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel 
when his attorney failed to inform him the state had extended an offer to plead guilty to Count I 
of the Information in exchange for a sentencing recommendation of one (1) year fixed, four (4) 
years indeterminate. Mr. Reed was prejudiced by counsels [sic] deficient performance. (R., p.6.) 
Mr. Reed did not supply additional information in support of this claim attached to the original 
petition. However, he did request the information be made available as part of the application. 
(R., p.7 ,r 9-10). Counsel for Mr. Reed then filed a Motion to Unseal Pre-Sentence Report (R., 
6 
p.24-25.) The district court convened a status hearing March 3, 2010 (Tr.p.5-10) to address 
counsel's motion, therein several affidavits were brought to the district courts attention, where 
ultimately, the evidentiary hearing was set for May 12, 2010. (Tr.p.11-96) 
In this instance, a factual issue was raised as to whether Mr. Reed received ineffective 
assistance of counsel when his attorney did not advise him of the one ( 1) plus four ( 4) plea offer; 
or fully inform Mr. Reed of the range of applicable choices going forward; the primary goals of 
representation, or that the plea offer would be null and void if he proceeded to the preliminary 
hearing. Moreover, Mr. Reed was never advised that proceeding to a preliminary hearing would 
wantonly expose him to a potential life sentence by means of an Amended Information, Count II, 
Persistent Violator, LC. § 19-2514. 
Testimony elicited at the evidentiary hearing demonstrated there was a reasonable 
probability that Mr. Reed would have accepted the plea offer. Former defense counsel Mr. 
Rolfsen testified that: " .. .it didn't look like a very good case". (Tr.p.66, Ln. 11) Counsel agreed 
that due to Mr. Reed's high likelihood of conviction, coupled with exposure to the persistent 
violator enhancement, that there wasn't a legal or factual defense to the case. (Tr.p.81, Ln.3-25) 
Mr. Reed has made a sufficient showing through admissible evidence that the proper 
course of action was for the district court to grant relief as prayed for in the petition. 
Because Mr. Reed has met the burden of showing that the preponderance of the evidence 
demonstrates he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and, that he was prejudiced by 




Mr. Reed's claims satisfy those requirements sufficient to demonstrate ineffective 
counsel set forth in Strickland and its progeny. 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Reed asks that this Court reverse the Final Decision 
Denying Post-Conviction Relief, and further, that the Court grant summary disposition in favor 
of the appellant 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of August, 2011. 
/S/ 
Jonathan D. Reed 
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